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Abstract 
Pigeons and other animals sometimes deviate from optimal choice behavior when given 
informative signals for delayed outcomes. For example, when pigeons are given a choice 
between an alternative that always leads to food after a delay and an alternative that leads to food 
only half of the time after a delay, preference changes dramatically depending on whether the 
stimuli during the delays are correlated with (signal) the outcomes or not. With signaled 
outcomes, pigeons show a much greater preference for the suboptimal alternative than with 
unsignaled outcomes. Key variables and research findings related to this phenomenon are 
reviewed, including the effects of durations of the choice and delay periods, probability of 
reinforcement, and gaps in the signal. We interpret the available evidence as reflecting a 
preference induced by signals for good news in a context of uncertainty. Other explanations are 
briefly summarized and compared. 
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When Good News Leads to Bad Choices 
Outcomes are rarely certain in nature. Chasing prey or foraging for seeds does not always 
lead to food. The shortest line at the grocery store is not always the quickest. Submitting a 
manuscript may or may not result in publication. Our lives are filled with choices that involve 
uncertainty, or probabilistic outcomes. The role of this uncertainty in the behavior of humans and 
other animals has been the target for much comparative research.  
Despite the importance of making good choices, human and nonhuman animals do not 
always choose optimally (see Ariely, 2008; Fantino, 2012; Kahneman, 2011; Zentall, 2015). One 
striking example of such suboptimal behavior comes from pigeons making decisions for delayed 
food rewards (e.g., Dunn & Spetch, 1990; Gipson, Alessandri, Miller, & Zentall, 2009; Kendall, 
1974).  
Consider a hungry pigeon given repeated choices between two options. One option 
always leads to food after a 40-s wait. The other option sometimes leads to food after 40 s and 
sometimes leads to no food after 40 s. The better choice is obvious – choosing the option that 
leads to food 100% of the time doubles the overall food intake compared to choosing the 50% 
option. This optimal choice would be expected not only from theories of rational choice but also 
from biological perspectives such as optimal foraging theory (Pyke, Pulliam, & Charnov, 1977); 
the importance of food procurement for survival should favor behavioral mechanisms that 
maximize energy intake while minimizing time, energy expenditure, and exposure to danger.  
 Indeed, under some circumstances, pigeons display strong preference for the more 
certain, and hence more optimal, option consistent with these expectations. Just as humans 
sometimes make irrational choices, however, pigeons sometimes behave suboptimally, choosing 
the 50% option as often or even more often than the one that provides more frequent food (e.g., 
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Dunn & Spetch, 1990; Gipson, Alessandri, Miller, & Zentall, 2009; Kendall, 1974, 1985; Spetch, 
Belke, Barnet, Dunn, & Pierce, 1990). Kendall was the first to show that, under certain 
conditions, pigeons will choose an alternative that provides food only 50% of the time over one 
that always provides food (Kendall, 1974, 1985). In his studies, the delay to food was the same 
on the 50% and 100% options. Thus, choice of the 50% option was clearly suboptimal in terms 
of acquiring food. This peculiar finding, that pigeons will sometimes choose the suboptimal 
option has been replicated many times and with several procedural variations in a growing body 
of literature we review here. 
 The critical variable that has emerged from this work is the presence of stimuli that 
predict, or signal, the upcoming outcome in an uncertain context. Figure 1 shows a typical 
signaled procedure (top panel) and an unsignaled procedure (bottom panel). Both procedures 
involve a choice between a 100% option and a 50% option, and both have the same delay 
periods. The only difference between the two procedures is that the red and green delay stimuli 
are perfectly correlated with the food and no-food outcomes in the signaled procedure and 
uncorrelated in the unsignaled procedure. Although the presence or absence of signals does not 
alter the food payoff (it remains a choice between 100% and 50% food), the pigeons’ behavior is 
very sensitive to the change. For example, Dunn and Spetch (1990, Experiment 3) directly 
compared signalled and unsignalled conditions in an ABA design. Figure 2 shows that pigeons 
frequently chose the 50% option when the outcomes were signalled, but switched to preference 
for the 100% option when they were not signalled. Note that any choice of the 50% option is 
suboptimal in the sense that it lowers the overall rate of food obtained. This preference for 
signalled reinforcers also resembles some casino games (e.g., slot machines), with implications 
for understanding human gambling and other real-world examples of suboptimal behavior (Lalli 
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& Mauro, 1995; Laude, Beckmann, Daniels, & Zentall, 2014; Zentall & Stagner, 2011a). For an 
excellent review of the implications of suboptimal choice for gambling in humans, see Zentall 
and Laude (2013). 
 Our review focuses on the psychological mechanisms that explain why pigeons are 
sometimes drawn to suboptimal choices in the case of probabilistic outcomes. We summarize the 
body of literature that illustrates the function of predictive signals and other key variables in 
driving suboptimal choice. We then describe a framework for understanding the role of the 
signal for food (good news) and the signal for no food (bad news) and briefly review other 
approaches.  
Factors That Affect Suboptimal Choice 
 Six variables have proved critical in the demonstration of suboptimal choice: (1) the 
contingencies between the delay stimuli and the outcomes, (2) the response requirement in the 
choice phase, (3) the delay to food reward, (4) the contiguity between the choice response and 
presentation of the signal for good news, (5) the probability of reinforcement, and (6) factors 
related to self-control.  
1. Signal Contingencies   
  As noted above, Kendall (1974) showed that signals for reward can exert powerful 
effects on behavior that run counter to the overall rate of food delivery. Frequent choice of the 
suboptimal option occurred only when the delayed food on the 50% side was signalled by a 
stimulus that immediately followed choice of that option. The importance of the signal 
contingencies has now been demonstrated across a variety of probabilistic choice procedures 
(e.g., Dunn and Spetch, 1990; Spetch et al., 1990; Stagner, Laude, & Zentall, 2012; Zentall & 
Stagner, 2012).  
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In one recent procedure that generated extreme swings in preference, Stagner and Zentall 
(2010) compared 20% reinforcement with 50% reinforcement. When outcomes on both 
alternatives were not signalled, choices of the suboptimal 20% alternative were infrequent (about 
15% of the choices). When outcomes were signalled on the 20% alternative but not on the 50% 
alternative, the 20% alternative was chosen on roughly 90% of the trials – an extreme preference 
for the suboptimal option. Another variant of this basic procedure pits a small certain reinforcer 
against a low probability of a larger reinforcer. As Zentall and Stagner (2011a) noted, varying 
both amount and probability provides a closer analogue to the human gambling experience. They 
compared one alternative that ended with a 100% probability of 3 pellets to another alternative 
that ended with a 20% probability of 10 pellets and 80% probability of no pellets. Their results 
are presented in Figure 3 and show that when the outcomes were not signalled during the delays, 
pigeons preferred the alternative that ended with 3 pellets. When the outcomes were signalled, 
they preferred the probabilistic alternative that ended with an average of 2 pellets.  
The importance of signal contingencies is also highlighted in recent neuroscience studies 
with monkeys. Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka (2009) gave monkeys a choice between two 
options that both led 50% of the time to a large water reward and 50% of the time to a small 
water reward, using visual saccades as the choice response. For both options, looking at one of 
the choice stimuli led to one of two visually distinct stimuli that remained on for a 2.5-s delay 
and was then followed by the presentation of the water reward directly into the monkey’s mouth. 
The critical difference between the two options was that for one of them the delay stimuli 
signalled which reward would occur, whereas for the other option, the delay stimuli were 
uncorrelated with the reward. Both monkeys developed a strong preference for the option with 
signaled outcomes. Moreover, a recent follow-up study demonstrated that thirsty monkeys are 
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even willing to forego some water in order to receive this advance information about which 
reward was upcoming (Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015).  
These studies also provided evidence for a potential neural mechanism for this preference 
for good news signals (Blanchard et al., 2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009). In the 
monkeys, midbrain dopamine neurons responded differently to the delay cues. At the onset of the 
informative cue that signalled the big reward, there was a burst of neuronal firing; no such burst 
was seen at the onset of any of the other cues. These results suggest that the informative signal 
for reward might affect preference through an amplified positive reward prediction error signal 
of the sort typically encoded by dopamine neurons (e.g., Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997).  
The role of the signal contingencies in suboptimal choice is also consistent with an 
extensive literature on similar comparisons between signalled and unsignalled contingencies in 
observing behavior (in which subjects respond in order to produce informative cues, e.g., 
McMillan, 1974, Wyckoff, 1952; see Dinsmoor, 1983 for a review) and related choice 
procedures (Alsop & Davison, 1986; Fantino & Moore, 1980; Green & Rachlin, 1977; Hursh & 
Fantino, 1974; Roper & Zentall, 1999).  
2. Response Requirement in the Choice Phase 
A critical feature of Kendall's (1974, 1985) results was that high levels of suboptimal 
choice occurred only when a single peck was required for the transition from the choice phase to 
the delay phase. Kendall (1974, Experiment 1) reported preference for the 50% alternative with a 
fixed-ratio (FR) 1 choice requirement. In a comparable set of exploratory conditions in a second 
experiment with a variable-interval (VI) 20-s requirement, suboptimal choice was lower and less 
consistent.  
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This dependence on the nature of the choice response was replicated in more extensive 
comparisons by Dunn and Spetch (1990, Experiment 3). They varied the schedule in the choice 
phase across four values as shown in Table 1. Preference for the suboptimal alternative was 
obtained with the FR 1 but shifted to the optimal alternative as the response requirement 
increased. Note that the opposite pattern occurs when the outcomes are not signalled: Spetch and 
Dunn (1987) reported that preference for the optimal (100%) alternative over an unsignalled 
50% alternative decreased (but did not reverse) as the choice schedule was lengthened from VI 
45 s to VI 180 s.  
3. Duration of Delays to Food 
 In general, longer delays to food lead to increased suboptimal choice. For example, 
Spetch et al. (1990) manipulated the duration of the delay to food in three experiments. 
Suboptimal choice was greater with 30-s delays compared to 5-s delays; greater with 30–s delays 
compared to 10-s delays; and greater with 50-s delays compared to 10-s delays. Suboptimal 
choice did not differ in comparisons between longer delays (e.g., 30 s vs. 50 s). Spetch, 
Mondloch, Belke, and Dunn (1994, Experiment 3) also reported greater suboptimal choice with 
30-s delays than with 5-s delays. The overall pattern in the data from the two studies (Spetch et 
al. 1990, 1994) is clear in Table 2. In sum, in procedures with a single response requirement in 
the choice phase and outcomes signalled during the delays, suboptimal choice systematically 
increased as the delays to food were increased from 5 to 30 s and did not vary with longer delays.  
4. Immediacy of Signals for Good News 
To test the role of the signal for food in reinforcing the choice response, McDevitt, 
Spetch, and Dunn (1997) used a “gap” procedure, developed earlier by Belke and Spetch (1994, 
Experiment 2). The rationale was simple: If a signal for food functions as a conditioned 
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reinforcer for the choice response that produces it, then inserting even a small, 5-s gap between 
the choice response and the presentation of the signal should substantially reduce or even 
eliminate the conditioned reinforcement.  
 McDevitt et al. (1997) tested this prediction by inserting a gap prior to the onset of one or 
more of the delay stimuli. The gap eliminated the first 5 s of a terminal-link stimulus, so that the 
response keys were darkened for 5 s following the choice response, after which the terminal-link 
stimulus was presented for the remainder of the delay. It is important to note that the delay to 
primary reinforcement remained unchanged when the gap was added in order to maintain the 
effect of primary reinforcement while degrading only the conditioned reinforcement. Figure 4 
shows the conditions in their study. The NONE condition consisted of a standard baseline 
procedure in which pigeons chose between a 100% option and a signalled 50% option. The mean 
choice proportion for the 50% option during baseline was .54, indicating that the pigeons 
behaved suboptimally by choosing the 50% option just as often as the 100% option.  
As shown in Figure 5, when the gap preceded only the 50% S- (signal for no food) or the 
100% S+ (signal for food), there was little change in the overall choice proportions, indicating 
that these delay stimuli did not function as conditioned punishers or conditioned reinforcers, 
respectively. In contrast, placing a gap preceding only the 50% S+ resulted in a large shift away 
from the 50% option. Thus, despite the fact that the signals for food on the two alternatives 
provided identical information about the delay to food, only the 50% S+ appears to function as a 
strong conditioned reinforcer. When the gaps preceded both the 50% S+ and the 50% S- (in the 
All and 50% Both conditions), the level of suboptimal choice decreased. A similar procedure, 
with starlings, also showed that delaying the onset of the informative cues reduces suboptimal 
choice (Vasconcelos, Monteiro, & Kacelnik, 2015). Taken together, these findings provide 
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insight into the functions of the various stimuli in the suboptimal choice procedure and, of 
particular note here, illustrate that signals for food may function differently if there is a context 
of uncertainty. There are parallels in other recent explorations of the effects of uncertainty (e.g., 
Anselme, Robinson, & Berridge, 2013). Uncertainty enhances the value of the stimulus that 
resolves it. 
5. Probability of reinforcement  
 Although the initial demonstrations of suboptimal preference were shown in a procedure 
in which a signalled 50% food alternative was pitted against a 100% food alternative (see Figure 
1), larger effects have been found with other probabilities of reinforcement. For example, Dunn 
and Spetch (1990) conducted a pilot test with two birds in which the suboptimal alternative 
signalled 80% food and the optimal alternative provided 100% food, thus decreasing the 
difference in primary reinforcement between the two alternatives compared to the standard 
procedure. Both birds showed extreme preference for the suboptimal alternative (94% and 95% 
preference). In another example, Gipson et al. (2009, Experiment 2) reduced the probability of 
reinforcement on the optimal alternative from a signalled 100% to an unsignalled 75%, and 
found that pigeons preferred the suboptimal alternative (signalled 50% reinforcement) an 
average of 76% of the time. In those studies, the higher level of preference compared to the 
standard procedure is not surprising because the difference between the probabilities on the two 
alternatives was reduced.  
Zentall, Laude, Stagner, and Smith (2015) compared 75% unsignalled reinforcement  
with 25% or 50% signalled reinforcement. The lower percentage of food was preferred in both 
comparisons with no difference in the level of preference. In another study noted above, Stagner 
and Zentall (2010) reduced the probability of food associated with both alternatives, pitting a 
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signalled 20% food alternative against an unsignalled 50% food alternative, and found 
preference for the suboptimal alternative was even higher (87% or above across three 
conditions). Using a similar design, Vasconcelos et al. (2015) reduced the probability of 
reinforcement on the unsignalled alternative in starlings down from 20% to 0% in 5% 
increments. They found that suboptimal choice started to decrease only when the probability of 
reinforcement was 5%.  
At this point, it is clear that suboptimal preference occurs across a wide range of 
comparisons and is not directly tied to the absolute difference in probability of reinforcement on 
the two alternatives. A full parametric manipulation of the probability of the suboptimal and 
optimal alternatives remains to be done. 
6. Factors Related to Self-Control 
 Dunn and Spetch (1990) observed that suboptimal choice with probabilistic alternatives 
shares features with self-control procedures in that suboptimal choice, like impulsivity, is 
characterized by preference for a smaller, more immediate reward over a larger, more delayed 
reward (e.g., Rachlin & Green, 1972). In the suboptimal procedures described above, the small 
immediate reward is a conditioned reinforcer, and the large delayed reward is the primary (food) 
reinforcer. As in the typical self-control procedures, suboptimal choice results when the smaller 
immediate reward begins to exert as much or more control than the larger delayed reward.  
 The same underlying mechanism may be responsible for both types of choice: namely, a 
subject’s sensitivity to the immediacy of an outcome. Impulsivity has been described by the 
slope of a delay discounting function in which variations in delay are associated with the 
discounting of another reinforcement variable (such as amount or probability). The steepness of 
the discounting function corresponds with the degree of impulsivity, or lack of self-control, 
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shown by a subject. Preliminary research has shown that some of the manipulations that affect 
temporal discounting on self-control tasks also affect suboptimal choice with probabilistic 
alternatives. For example, Laude, Beckmann, et al. (2014) found that pigeons’ suboptimal choice 
with probabilistic alternatives was correlated with the steepness of the slope on a delay 
discounting function obtained on a separate task. In other words, pigeons which were more 
impulsive as indicated by the discounting function showed a greater degree of suboptimal choice. 
Figure 6 compares the percentage of suboptimal choices for pigeons with steeper discounting 
functions (high impulsivity) and pigeons with shallower discounting functions (low impulsivity) 
in the Laude et al. results. Research with humans has shown that pathological gamblers have a 
much steeper delay discounting function than non-gamblers, and gamblers with a history of 
substance abuse have an even steeper function (Petry, 2001).  
 Research with humans also suggests that lower income levels (i.e., greater deprivation) 
may be associated with steeper delay discounting functions, indicating that impulsiveness might 
increase in conditions of economic deprivation (e.g., Green, Myerson, Lichtman, Rosen, & Fry, 
1996; but see Oliveira, Calvert, Green, & Myerson, 2013). Although the evidence of the effects 
of deprivation on discounting in animals is mixed (e.g., Bradshaw & Szabadi, 1992; Eisenberger, 
Masterson, & Lowman, 1982; Oliveira et al., 2013), Laude, Pattison, and Zentall (2012) found 
that deprivation did affect suboptimal choice in pigeons. They presented pigeons with a choice 
between signalled 50% food (the suboptimal alternative) and unsignalled 75% food (the optimal 
alternative). Half of the pigeons were maintained at 75% of free-feeding body weight (high 
deprivation) and half were maintained at 90% of free-feeding body weight. Intuitively, one 
would expect the hungrier pigeons to more strongly prefer the alternative with the higher 
probability of food. Instead, at the end of training the birds maintained at the lower weights 
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showed, on average, an 84% preference for the suboptimal alternative, compared to a 32% 
preference for birds maintained at the higher weights. Thus, the choice behavior of the hungrier 
pigeons resulted in significantly fewer food reinforcers. Figure 7 shows the mean number of 
reinforcers per session for each group of pigeons in the Laude et al. study, illustrating the critical 
impact of suboptimal choice on food acquired.  
 Environmental enrichment is another variable that influences self-control and may 
influence suboptimal choice. Indeed, Pattison, Laude, and Zentall (2013) demonstrated an effect 
of environmental enrichment on suboptimal choice behavior. Pigeons given daily access to a 
large group cage (enriched condition) required significantly more sessions to develop suboptimal 
choice behavior compared to pigeons caged individually (isolated condition). Although the 
enriched environment did not prevent suboptimal preference, it did delay its development (but 
see Laude, Beckmann, et al., 2014).  
Is Bad News Actually Bad? 
 Given the clear evidence of the role of the signals for food, it would be reasonable to 
assume that signals for no food would have symmetrical punishing effects on choices. Thus, 
signals for no food on the 50% alternative should counteract the reinforcement by signals for 
food. This prediction would also be made from conventional wisdom: The signals for no food are 
essentially “timeouts” and hence should punish the choice response on the 50% alternative.  
 Several lines of evidence, however, suggest that the timeout stimulus has very little 
impact on the choice response. As seen in condition S- of Figure 5, McDevitt et al. (1997) 
showed that disrupting the contiguity between the choice response and onset of the timeout 
stimulus by inserting a gap had very little effect on choice. The duration of the timeout also does 
not seem to matter. For example, Spetch et al. (1994) held all other features of the choice 
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procedure constant while manipulating the duration of the timeout (5 or 55 s) and found no 
effect. Pisklak, McDevitt, Dunn, and Spetch (in press) reported a comparison with bad news on 
both alternatives. The good news outcome was food after 10 s on both alternatives. The bad news 
on the optimal alternative was food after 40 s; the bad news on the suboptimal alternative was no 
food after 40 s. The suboptimal alternative was preferred when the outcomes were signaled. 
Preference was sensitive to manipulations of the duration of delay to food but not to the duration 
of delay to no food.  
 Stagner, Laude, and Zentall (2011) hypothesized that perhaps the S- stimulus was 
ineffective because the pigeons avoided it, but their investigation found that pigeons still 
preferred the 50% alternative even when the signal for the timeout was a diffuse stimulus that 
could not be avoided by turning away. Laude, Stagner, and Zentall (2014) tested whether the 
timeout stimulus on the suboptimal alternative acquired inhibitory properties. Although the 
stimulus initially exerted some inhibition, the inhibitory effects decreased over training while 
preference for the suboptimal alternative increased.  
 Finally, the literature on observing includes several investigations of the role of 
informative signals. In the typical observing procedure, schedules of reinforcement and 
extinction alternate without correlated stimuli. Observing responses produce correlated stimuli, 
good news if the reinforcement schedule is in effect or bad news if it is not. The signal for good 
news maintains the observing response but the signal for bad news does not (Dinsmoor, 1983; 
Silberberg & Fantino, 2010). Nor is there direct evidence that the signal for bad news is 
punishing (Dinsmoor, Browne, & Lawrence, 1972; cf: Killeen, Wald, & Cheney, 1980). 
 Thus, data from a variety of procedures converge to support the notion that signals for 
bad news are not punishing and appear to have little or no direct influence on suboptimal choice.  
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These data also provide evidence against an intuitive account of the signalling effect, namely that 
the information per se is driving suboptimal choice. Although the signals for good news are 
valuable and provide conditioned reinforcement for responding, signals for bad news, although 
just as informative, do not appear to have either positive or negative value. The evolutionary 
benefit of having signals for good news function as conditioned reinforcers is intuitive, as 
organisms are likely to benefit from devoting attentional and behavioral resources to stimuli 
correlated with food. In contrast, the apparent absence of negative value associated with signals 
for bad news is not as intuitive. One possibility is that these signals function differently because 
signals for food require organisms to engage in preparatory behaviors, whereas signals for the 
absence of food do not. In any case, an explanation based solely on a traditional information 
approach cannot account for the effect of the signals in suboptimal choice procedures. An 
alternative account based on the temporal information provided by signals for reinforcement, 
however, may represent a more useful approach (e.g., Shahan & Cunningham, 2015). 
Is Suboptimal Choice for 50% versus 100% Simply Indifference? 
 Although choice between signalled and unsignalled options can clearly lead to extreme 
suboptimal preference (e.g., Gipson et al., 2009), suboptimal choice for signalled 50% over 
100% food is typically only slightly above chance, often with high inter-individual variability. 
Therefore, Zentall et al. (2015) suggested that the individual differences might be a procedural 
artifact and reflect side biases that occur when birds are indifferent between options. In support 
of this hypothesis, they reported results which suggest that pigeons are sensitive to the value of a 
conditioned reinforcer but not to its frequency. Specifically, they found equal suboptimal choice 
for pigeons that chose between signalled 25% and unsignalled 75% reinforcement as compared 
to pigeons that chose between signalled 50% and unsignalled 75% reinforcement. In addition, 
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Stagner et al. (2012) found indifference between 20% signalled and 50% signalled 
reinforcement. A recent study by Pisklak et al. (in press) also found that the level of preference 
for signalled 25% over 100% reinforcement was similar to that for signalled 50% over 100% 
reinforcement. This pattern of results led Zentall et al. (2015) to suggest that pigeons should also 
be expected to be indifferent between signalled 50% and 100% reinforcement because each of 
these alternatives provide signals for food that differ only in frequency.  
For reasons discussed in greater detail below, we argue that the signal for food on the 
50% option does not have the same value as the signal on the 100% option, and that simple 
biases do not account for suboptimal choice. There is evidence for preference rather than 
indifference. First, contingency reversals were implemented in the original studies by Kendall 
(1974, 1985), with most birds reversing their preferences when the sides associated with the 50% 
and 100% reinforcement were changed. This contingency reversal procedure was also used by 
Belke and Spetch (1994) to determine whether three birds that showed strong preferences for the 
suboptimal option were showing side biases. As shown in Figure 8, these birds all showed a 
reversal of their suboptimal preference.  
 Second, the results of the gap study by McDevitt et al. (1997) provide compelling 
evidence against the notion that choice between 50% and 100% reinforcement represents 
“schedule indifference … masked by spatial preference” (Zentall et al., 2015). If pigeons were 
indeed indifferent between the 50% and 100% options because both provide food signals of 
equal value, then choice should be equally affected by inserting a gap prior to onset of the food 
signal on either alternative. As seen in Figure 5, however, suboptimal choice was selectively 
affected by inserting a gap prior to the food signal on the 50% alternative. Specifically, 
suboptimal choice declined when a gap was inserted after all choices (condition ALL), after any 
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choice of the 50% option (condition BOTH), or only prior to the food signal on the 50% option. 
In contrast, inserting a gap prior to the food signal on the 100% option had no substantial effect.  
 Together, these results strongly suggest that the signal for food on the 50% alternative 
and the signal for food on the 100% alternative are not equivalent reinforcers that differ only in 
frequency. The suggestion that pigeons are indifferent to the frequency of conditioned 
reinforcers is also inconsistent with several studies that have explicitly shown frequency of 
conditioned reinforcement to be an important determinant of choice behavior in other procedures 
(McDevitt & Williams, 2010; Shahan, Podlesnik, & Jimenez-Gomez, 2006; Williams & Dunn, 
1991). Why then, might Stagner et al. (2012) have observed indifference, on average, when 
pigeons chose between a signalled 20% reinforcement alternative and a signalled 50% 
reinforcement alternative? One potential explanation lies in the fact that altering the probability 
of reinforcement also changes the value of the conditioned reinforcer. The 20% alternative 
provides less overall primary reinforcement than the 50% alternative, and that leaner context 
serves to enhance the value of the conditioned reinforcer that signals food. Thus, primary 
reinforcement is reduced at the same time that the value of the more immediate conditioned 
reinforcement is enhanced, resulting in roughly equivalent value between the two alternatives.    
Signals for Good News: The SiGN Hypothesis 
 Dunn and Spetch (1990) proposed an explanatory framework based on the assumption 
that choices depend on two sources of reinforcement: (1) the delayed primary reinforcement 
(e.g., food) and (2) the reinforcement provided by signals that follow a choice response. Their 
model was inspired by Fantino’s delay reduction theory (DRT, Fantino, 1969; Fantino, Preston 
& Dunn, 1993). Fantino’s theory assumes that an event reinforces a choice to the extent that it 
signals a reduction in the average waiting time to food. Dunn and Spetch (1990) proposed that 
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suboptimal choice could be accommodated within a delay reduction framework by assuming that 
the choice response serves as the reference point for assessing a signal for a delay to food. 
Specifically, they proposed that any event that signals a reduction in the delay beyond that 
already signalled by the choice response will function as a conditioned reinforcer. Our 
hypothesis also assumes that bad news plays no role other than to create a context of uncertainty. 
We will refer to this explanation as the Signals for Good News (SiGN) hypothesis. Here we will 
examine how the SiGN hypothesis holds up to the wealth of evidence that has been developed in 
recent years, particularly through the work of Zentall and his colleagues. 
 A critical feature of the SiGN hypothesis is that the occurrence of the choice response 
itself establishes a new context for comparison; it resets the local “reference point” (Kahneman, 
2011) against which any changes in state are compared. Research with humans has shown that 
the value associated with a particular outcome is influenced by the current reference point. For 
example, news of a raise in pay would be rewarding to an employee who is expecting a possible 
pay cut; the same news would be less rewarding if the employee already knows the raise is 
coming. In these cases, the context sets a reference point against which the new state (a raise) is 
evaluated. Similarly, for the pigeon choosing between the 50% and 100% options, the value of a 
delay stimulus will depend on the local context provided by the choice itself. A signal predicting 
food at the end of a trial would be good news in the context of a gamble with a 50% chance of 
getting nothing. In contrast, a signal predicting food at the end of a trial would have less value if 
the food was already perfectly predicted by the choice response, as is the case on the 100% 
option.  
It follows from this analysis that the reinforcing effects of the delay stimuli should 
depend critically on the contingencies between these stimuli and the outcome at the end of the 
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trial. If the food and no-food outcomes on the 50% alternative are not differentially signalled (as 
in the "unsignalled" condition in Figure 1), then choice of that alternative is followed by a 
redundant stimulus that signals no change in the possibility of food or no food. In this case, onset 
of the delay stimulus does not signal good news because there is no improvement in local 
context. Thus, the SiGN hypothesis is consistent with the numerous studies that have 
demonstrated that suboptimal choice occurs only in procedures with signalled outcomes (e.g., 
Kendall, 1974; Spetch et al., 1990; Stagner et al., 2012; Zentall & Stagner, 2012). 
The SiGN hypothesis puts the emphasis on the local context created by the transition 
between the choice response and the presentation of the signals for food. When the option that 
always leads to food (100%) is chosen, the choice peck itself and onset of the food signal predict 
the same delayed reward so the signal provides no improvement in the local context. Therefore, 
the food signal on the 100% alternative should not function to reinforce the choice. In contrast, 
choice of the 50% alternative may or may not lead to food. Therefore, onset of the food signal 
provides a substantial improvement in the local context and should function as an effective 
conditioned reinforcer. The SiGN hypothesis assumes that suboptimal choice in signalled 
procedures is driven by this imbalance in the conditioned reinforcement on the two alternatives. 
The results from the “gap” procedure (McDevitt et al., 1997) highlight this difference in the 
function of the two signals for food; suboptimal preference was shown to be driven largely by an 
immediate conditioned reinforcer on the 50% option.  
  The SiGN hypothesis accounts for the shift away from suboptimal choice when the 
response requirement is changed, as in procedures with VI choice schedules (e.g., Dunn & 
Spetch, 1990; Kendall, 1974, 1985). In a VI schedule, responses are only occasionally effective 
in producing a transition from the choice phase to the delay phase. In addition, the duration of 
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the initial link is longer, introducing greater temporal uncertainty as to when the delay phase will 
begin. Both these factors mean that the food signal on the 100% option is no longer redundant 
and its onset will signal an improvement in the prediction of food, with the degree of 
improvement increasing as a function of the VI duration. Therefore, when VI schedules are used 
in the choice phase, signals for food on both the 100% and the 50% alternatives should function 
as conditioned reinforcers. The less predictive the choice responses are, the stronger both food 
signals would be as reinforcers. As the disparity in conditioned reinforcement is reduced on the 
two alternatives, choice should be increasingly determined by the only other difference, the 
relative rates of food (primary reinforcement).  
Another key variable for the SiGN hypothesis is the duration of the delay to food 
following the choice response. It is important to remember that, according to the SiGN 
hypothesis, the primary reinforcement provided by the food and the conditioned reinforcement 
provided by signals for good news operate jointly to influence choice behavior. If the delays to 
food are very short, primary reinforcement should be a strong determinant of choice. As delays 
to food increase, the effect of primary reinforcement should diminish as illustrated by numerous 
studies of temporal discounting (e.g., McDevitt & Williams, 2001).  
The interplay between delayed primary reinforcement (food) and immediate conditioned 
reinforcement can also account for the large individual differences often seen in suboptimal 
choice procedures. Specifically, if birds differ in their individual rates of delay discounting, then 
the relative control by the food and by the signal for good news could be expected to differ 
across individuals. Indeed, Laude, Beckmann, et al. (2014) reported that suboptimal preference 
was correlated with the steepness of individual rates of delay discounting functions. 
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At present, the SiGN hypothesis is a conceptual description of the factors that are 
assumed to operate jointly to produce suboptimal choice. A formalization of this hypothesis in a 
quantified model based on reinforcement learning is currently underway (Ludvig, Spetch, Dunn, 
& McDevitt, 2015). Briefly, in the computational model, animals learn to predict upcoming 
reinforcers through an error-correction mechanism, similar to the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1998). In addition, whenever the prediction changes 
upward due to the introduction of a new cue (e.g., at the start of the terminal link), a good news 
bonus is generated. This good news bonus directly sums with the reinforcer strength, increasing 
preference for that option. The exact form of the relationship between the good news bonus and 
the probability and delay of reinforcement, however, is as yet unclear, and significant work is 
still necessary to explore the interplay of these factors in the model and the consequent 
implications for behavior.  
Relationship to Other Models of Suboptimal Choice 
Hyperbolic-Decay Model 
Our SiGN hypothesis shares some features in common with Mazur’s Hyperbolic-Decay 
Model (HDM), which was originally developed to describe how the value of a reinforcer 
decreases as reinforcer delay increases (Mazur, 1984, 1989, 2001). HDM has also successfully 
described preference for variable reinforcement schedules over fixed reinforcement schedules, as 
well as the basic finding related to suboptimal preference for signalled reinforcement 
alternatives. According to HDM, conditioned reinforcement is a hyperbolic function of the delay 
(D) to primary reinforcement associated with an alternative. Simply put, as the delay to a 
reinforcer increases, the value of that alternative decreases. The most important aspect of HDM 
for the present discussion concerns which time variables are included in the estimation of D. 
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HDM includes only time spent in the presence of stimuli that are correlated with food. Time 
spent in the presence of stimuli not correlated with food (i.e., signals for timeout) are not 
included, and therefore do not affect the value of an alternative.  
Similar to the SiGN hypothesis, HDM emphasizes that conditioned reinforcement is a 
primary determinant of behavior. However, HDM assumes that conditioned reinforcement is the 
only contributor to value of an alternative (Mazur, 1989, 2001), whereas the SiGN hypothesis 
assumes that choice behavior is a result of the influence of both primary and conditioned 
reinforcement.  
Both the SiGN hypothesis and HDM assume that time spent in a signalled timeout does 
not detract from the value of an alternative. In fact, HDM assumes no role at all for a signalled 
timeout in the value of an alternative. In this way, HDM can account for suboptimal choice, 
because time spent in the presence of all delay stimuli is included in the estimation of D (and 
thus decreases the value of the alternative), except when timeouts are signalled by unique stimuli 
(Mazur, 1991). The time spent in a signalled timeout has no role in HDM, but according to the 
SiGN hypothesis, the possibility of a timeout alters the local context, allowing the S+ to provide 
good news.  
 Like the SiGN hypothesis, HDM predicts that the value of an alternative (and preference 
for that alternative) will decrease as the delay to reinforcement increases. In the standard choice 
between a 100% alternative and a signalled 50% alternative, HDM can never predict preference 
for the 50% alternative over the 100% when the delays on the two alternatives are equal (Mazur, 
1995). In contrast, the SiGN hypothesis allows for the possibility that preference may be 
observed for the suboptimal alternative.  
Contrast 
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 Zentall and colleagues have proposed another account of preference in suboptimal choice 
procedures (Gipson et al., 2009; Zentall & Stagner, 2011a). Similar to the SiGN hypothesis, they 
suggest that the signal for food is enhanced in value because it is contrasted with the value of the 
choice stimulus. Thus, when the signal for food occurs in the context of an alternative that 
sometimes ends in food and sometimes ends in no food, the value of that signal is enhanced by 
the contrast between the conditions in the choice phase and the delay phase. The contrast view 
provides no negative role for the signal for no food, so that the enhanced value of the signal for 
food is not counteracted by decreased value of the signal for no food. Contrast is absent when the 
probabilistic outcomes are not signalled, and therefore preference is expected to shift to the 
alternative with the richer reinforcement schedule.  
 The contrast account and HDM make similar predictions, but as noted above, HDM 
cannot account for preference (i.e., greater than .50) for a low probability food alternative over a 
100% food alternative, whereas the contrast account can make such a prediction (Gipson et al., 
2009; Mazur, 1995). Contrast and the SiGN hypothesis make very similar predictions, which is 
not surprising given the similarity in their analyses. Attempts to distinguish between the contrast 
account and DRT (Fantino, 1969), which initially inspired the SiGN hypothesis, have been 
complicated by the difference in the procedures used by the two approaches (Singer, Berry, & 
Zentall, 2007; Singer & Zentall, 2011). The SiGN hypothesis differs from DRT in that it focuses 
on local context effects, a focus that is shared with the contrast model. Comparisons between 
SiGN and the contrast account are limited for now because the contrast account has not yet been 
extended to manipulations of the choice phase and the delays to reinforcement. As noted by 
Gipson et al. (2009), contrast is the least quantitative of the three approaches. Future work 
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formalizing the SiGN and contrast hypotheses will be important for distinguishing these similar 
conceptual frameworks and providing clear, testable predictions. 
Disengagement 
 Another hypothesis comes from a recent reinforcement-learning model of observing 
behavior (Beierholm & Dayan, 2010). According to this model, suboptimal choice would occur 
because animals occasionally disengage from (i.e., stop paying attention to) lower-valued 
conditioned stimuli during the delay to food. Disengagement is formalized in the model as a 
reduced likelihood of learning from the reinforcer when it happens. As a result, animals 
underestimate the value of those conditioned stimuli because they fail to associate any food that 
eventually arrives with the predictive cue. Less valuable conditioned stimuli lead to higher 
degrees of disengagement, and thus greater underestimation of the value of alternatives that lead 
to those conditioned stimuli.  
 This model provides a possible explanation for situations where animals choose between 
signalled and unsignalled alternatives (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2015; Bromberg-Martin & 
Hikosaka, 2009; Roper & Zentall, 1999; Stagner & Zentall, 2010). In the signalled case, one cue 
is perfectly predictive of reward, and the other cue is perfectly predictive of non-reward. The 
animals do not disengage from the cue predictive of reward, and thus correctly learn its value. In 
the unsignalled case, neither cue is perfectly predictive of reward, and thus the animals 
occasionally disengage during the delay and underestimate the value of those cues. As a result, 
animals show a preference for the signalled, suboptimal option.  
 The disengagement model, however, fails for situations where the choice is between a 
50% alternative and a 100% alternative in which both sides are signalled. In this situation, the 
model predicts no disengagement on the 100% alternative and thus predicts a large preference 
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for the 100% alternative, yet animals sometimes prefer the 50% alternative (Dunn & Spetch, 
1990; Kendall, 1974; Spetch et al., 1994). 
Implications & Future Directions 
 Suboptimal choice as evidenced in the procedures summarized above provides a 
challenge for models of choice that minimize or eliminate the role of conditioned reinforcement 
(Davison & Baum, 2006; Shahan, 2010, 2013; see Bell & McDevitt, 2014). Other lines of 
evidence make similar arguments for the concept of conditioned reinforcement as incorporated in 
the SiGN hypothesis (e.g., Bell & Williams, 2013; Williams, 1994). 
 Despite extensive investigation across variations of the suboptimal choice procedure, 
several variables are still largely unexplored. For example, the importance of contiguity between 
the signal and the outcome has not yet been evaluated in this paradigm –specifically, would 
inserting a gap between the offset of the signal and the presentation of food have the same effects 
as inserting a gap between the choice response and the signal? The contingency between the 
good news signal and food has also not been parametrically manipulated; the suboptimal 
alternative has almost always provided one stimulus that is perfectly predictive of food and 
another that is perfectly predictive of no food (but see Zentall & Stagner, 2011b). Would the 
reinforcing effectiveness of the good news stimulus be disrupted more by reducing its correlation 
with food or by adding some food outcomes after the other stimulus? As quantitative models 
become available, it will also be important to systematically explore the probabilities of food on 
each alternative. For example, if the optimal alternative provides 100% reinforcement, how 
would choice be affected if the percentage of food signalled on the suboptimal alternative varied 
between 10 and 90%? Similarly, how would choice be affected if the suboptimal alternative was 
held constant at 50%, but the optimal alternative is varied from 100% to 60%? A full 
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understanding of the phenomena will require further parametric investigations of the limits of 
suboptimal choice. 
 There is a wealth of evidence for suboptimal choice in pigeons, but few investigations 
with other species. In a series of experiments with rats using an adjusting-delay procedure, 
Mazur (2005, 2007) failed to find any influence of signals on probabilistic choice. One 
contributing factor may be differences in the delays used with the two species, and another factor 
may be differences in the way the two species discount primary reinforcement (Mazur & Bondi, 
2009). Recent work by Beckmann and Chow (2015) suggests that species-specific differences in 
sign vs. goal tracking may provide a further complication in comparisons of choice tasks across 
species. Monkeys, in contrast to rats, do display a similar form of suboptimal choice (Bromberg-
Martin & Hikosaka, 2009; Blanchard et al., 2015) as do starlings (Vasconcelos et al., 2015). 
Further work evaluating suboptimal choice with other species may provide a basis for 
speculation about the evolutionary pressures that underlie suboptimal choice. 
At present, there appear to be only a few investigations of suboptimal choice in humans 
using procedures derived from the pigeon work. Lalli, Mauro, and Mace (Experiment 1, 2000) 
developed a 100% vs. 50% procedure for two children with mild developmental delays. In 
conditions with 30-s delays to food, the children preferred the 100% alternative when outcomes 
were not signalled but preferred the 50% alternative when the outcomes were signalled. 
Preference for the 50% alternative was not obtained with shorter (10 s) delays to food. In a 
second experiment with another child with mild developmental delay, Lalli et al. inserted a 10-s 
gap before the signals for the outcomes (much like Belke & Spetch, 1994, and McDevitt et al., 
1997). In an ABAB sequence, the child preferred the 50% alternative when there was no gap, 
and preferred the 100% alternative when there was a gap.  
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More recently, Molet et al. (2012) developed a human version of the suboptimal choice 
task by embedding the contingencies in a video game. The goal of the game was to kill generals 
on enemy space ships, and hence the reward was number of generals killed. Participants chose 
between two planetary systems. Each choice was followed by entry into one of two planets 
distinguished by different colors (the delay stimuli). For one planetary system (signalled low 
probability), the planets signalled how many generals would be on the ship that could be 
destroyed; in this system, one planet occurred 20% of the time and had 10 generals aboard, and 
the other planet occurred 80% of the time and had no generals aboard. Therefore this planetary 
system paid off with an average of 2 generals killed. For the other planetary system (unsignalled 
high probability), there were again two planets with one appearing 20% of the time and one 
occurring 80% of the time. In this case, however, there were three generals aboard the ships in 
both planets; thus the average reward was three generals killed. There was a difference in 
suboptimal choice depending on gambling habits: most participants who did not frequently 
gamble showed low levels of suboptimal choice, whereas those participants who gambled 
regularly chose the low probability planet, on average, around half the time. The results of this 
interesting experiment suggest that humans who gamble frequently may be particularly drawn to 
stimuli that signal big wins in the context of uncertainty, much like pigeons. Interestingly, there 
was large individual variability among the humans who gambled frequently, as there is for 
pigeons.  
 Making good choices is crucial to survival in a complex and uncertain world. Here, we 
have reviewed evidence that pigeons, starlings, and sometimes monkeys and humans, exhibit 
significant suboptimal choices, giving up food, water, or money for advanced signals about 
upcoming rewards. These suboptimal choices reflect a desire for good news and may result from 
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simple, fundamental learning mechanisms that interact with the reward contingencies of the 
world in surprising and interesting ways. 
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Table 1.  Choice proportions for the suboptimal alternative as a function of initial-link schedule 






FR 1 .60 
VI 10 .41 
VI 30 .19 
VI 80 .18 
 
Notes:  All data shown are from Experiment 3 of Dunn and Spetch, 1990, and are averaged 
across four pigeons and in some cases across replications.  
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Table 2.  Choice proportions for the suboptimal alternative as a function of terminal-link (TL) 
duration in signaled concurrent chains with fixed-ratio 1 schedules in the initial link in 




Spetch et al. 
1990, Exp 1 
Spetch et al. 
1990, Exp 2 
Spetch et al. 
1990, Exp 3 
Spetch et al. 
1994, Exp 3 
Mean 
5 .15 .25  .11 .17 
10 .12  .30  .21 
30 .62 .56  .60 .59 
50 .58  .57  .58 
90 .67    .67 
 
Notes:  All data shown are averaged across birds and in some cases across replications.  The data 
are from 4, 8 and 4 birds, respectively, in Spetch et al., 1990, and 8 birds in Spetch et al., 1994.  
The data for Spetch et al., 1994 are no longer available so the choice proportions were derived 
from Figure 5 of that study. The table excludes conditions in which the intertrial interval was 
increased to 40 s.    
  




Figure 1. Schematic of the typical procedures used to study choice between 100% and 50% 
reinforcement in pigeons. Choice of the 100% alternative always leads to a delay period 
followed by food, whereas choice of the 50% alternative leads to the same delay but is followed 
by food only half of the time. Choice of the 50% alternative is considered suboptimal because it 
yields less food. The signalled (top) and unsignalled (bottom) procedures differ only in the 
correlation between the delay stimuli and the outcome on the 50% alternative. In the unsignalled 
procedure, the delay stimuli on the 50% alternative provide no information about whether the 
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In the signalled procedure, one stimulus signals that the delay will end in food and a visually 
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Figure 2. Choice proportions for the 50% (suboptimal) option averaged across the 5 birds in 
Experiment 3 of Dunn and Spetch (1990). All birds were tested in signalled (Sig) and 
unsignalled (Unsig) procedures in the order shown, and each condition was in effect until a 
stability criterion was met. Data are from the last nine sessions per condition. Error bars are 
standard error of the mean. Figure is adapted from “Choice with Uncertain Outcomes: 
Conditioned Reinforcement Effects,” by R. Dunn and M. L. Spetch, 1990, Journal of the 





































WHEN GOOD NEWS LEADS TO BAD CHOICES 44 
Figure 3. Percentage choice of the suboptimal (2-pellet) alternative by pigeons across sessions in 
a signalled procedure (discriminative stimuli) and an unsignalled procedure (non-discriminative 
stimuli). The suboptimal alternative provided 10 pellets with a probability of .2 and 0 pellets 
with a probability of .8. The optimal alternative always provided 3 pellets. Figure is reproduced 
from “Maladaptive Choice Behavior by Pigeons: An Animal Analogue and Possible Mechanism 
for Gambling (Sub-Optimal Human Decision-Making Behavior),” by T. R. Zentall, and J. 
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Figure 4. Schematic of the six conditions of the gap procedure tested by McDevitt et al (1997). 
In all conditions pigeons chose between a 100% alternative, which always provided food after a 
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30-s delay, and a signalled 50% alternative, which provided food after the delay on only half of 
the trials. The NONE was the baseline in which the delay stimuli immediately followed the 
choice. The other conditions had a 5-s gap (indicated by white bar) inserted between the choice 
and onset of the one or more of the delay stimuli. Figure is reconstructed from “Contiguity and 
Conditioned Reinforcement in Probabilistic Choice,” by M. A. McDevitt, M. L. Spetch, and R. 













Figure 5. Change in choice proportions for the 50% (suboptimal) alternative in conditions in 
which a 5-s gap preceded one or more delay stimuli, relative to the NONE condition in which 
there were no gaps. Suboptimal choice decreased substantially in all conditions that included a 
gap before the food signal on the 50% alternative (conditions ALL, BOTH and S+), whereas 
there was little change when the gap was inserted before only the 100% delay stimulus or the 
signal for no food (S-) on the 50% alternative. Figure is reconstructed from “Contiguity and 
Conditioned Reinforcement in Probabilistic Choice,” by M. A. McDevitt, M. L. Spetch, and R. 
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Figure 6. Mean percentage of suboptimal choice across sessions for pigeons that scored high on 
impulsivity in a separate delay discounting task (open circles) and for pigeons that scored lower 
on impulsivity in the discounting task (filled circles) in Laude, Beckmann et al., 2014. Figure 
reproduced from “Impulsivity Affects Suboptimal Gambling-like Choice by Pigeons,” by J. R. 
Laude, J. S. Beckmann, C. W. Daniels, and T. R. Zentall, 2014, Journal of Experimental 










Figure 7. Mean number of reinforcers obtained in each session of a suboptimal choice procedure 
for pigeons maintained under high food restriction (75% of free feeding weight) or low food 
restriction (90% of free feeding weight) in Laude et al., 2012. The choice task involved signalled 
50% versus unsignalled 75% reinforcement. Figure reproduced from “Hungry Pigeons Make 
Suboptimal Choices, Less Hungry Pigeons Do Not,” by J. R. Laude, K. F. Pattison, and T. R. 
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Figure 8. Proportion of choices for the suboptimal (signalled 50%) alternative over the 100% 
alternative for three pigeons that were given contingency reversals in Belke and Spetch, 1994. 
For the first block of sessions choice of the left key led to 50% reinforcement and during the next 
block of sessions the contingencies were switched so that the right key led to 50% reinforcement. 
Figure reproduced from “Choice Between Reliable and Unreliable Reinforcement Alternatives 
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Revisited: Preference for Unreliable Reinforcement,” by T. W. Belke and M. L. Spetch, 1994, 
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 62, p. 361.  
 
 
 
 
